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BOOK REVIEW
The Supreme Labor Court in Nazi Germany:
A Jurisprudential Analysis
by Marc Linder*
Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1987
Reviewed by L.S. Zacharias**
Azdak, the intractable judge in Bertolt Brecht's Caucasian
Chalk Circle,' ultimately commands our respect by looking within
himself rather than to the authorities who control his livelihood.
Yet, through Azdak's story Brecht makes a deeper point: namely,
that law has a habit of breaking down and that in entrusting decisions about justice to judges we misplace our faith.2 Marc Linder's
* Attorney, Texas Rural Legal Aid, Farmworker Division. B.A., University of
Chicago (1966); M.A. (1971), Ph.D., Princeton University (1973); J.D., Harvard
University (1983).
** Associate Professor, School of Management, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst.
1. The standard English version is in Brecht, Parables for the Theatre: Two
Plays (E. Bentley & M. Apelman trans. 1961).
2. Contrast, for instance, the political debate leading to a resolution among
comrades in Brecht's prologue with his description of Azdak's fortunes:
The Story Teller and Chorus:
And he broke the rules to save them;
Broken laws like bread he gave them;
Brought 'em to shore upon his crooked back.
And at last the poor and lowly
Had someone who was not too holy
To be bribed by empty hands: Azdak.
For two years it was his pleasure
To give beasts of prey short measure:
He became a wolf to fight the pack.
From All Hallows to All Hallows
On a chair beside the gallows
Dispensing justice in his fashion sat Azdak.
The Story Teller:
But the era of disorder came to an end.
The Grand Duke returned.
The Governor's wife returned.
A trial was held.
Many people died.
The suburbs burned anew.
And fear seized Azdak.
Id. at 101-06, 173.
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book, The Supreme Labor Court in Nazi Germany:A Jurisprudential Analysis,3 is a study of the society Brecht had just left, one in
which law had by all descriptions broken down. Yet, numerous
practitioners continued to engage in something that looked like
law. Just what, Linder asks, were these people doing? What did
they seem to think they were doing? And what effect did they
have on the course of social events in Nazi Germany?
The book is divided into three roughly equal parts, each focusing on a different element of the Nazi regime's rule, objectives
and constraints. Together, the three parts illustrate with depth
and irony the complexities and limits of a positive legal system.
The first, introductory part is an account of the jurisprudence that
governed the adjudication of labor disputes during the Nazi regime.4 Linder focuses particularly on the regime's legal spokesmen, their attempts to dress Nazi political outcomes in
conventional judicial garb, and the specifics of the labor courts.
5
The second part reviews the Nazi reconception of labor relations.
Linder describes the Nazi dilemma: on the one side the authority
of Germany's militant industrial capitals, on the other side intractable and open class conflict which the earlier Weimar regime had
legitimated. Both to further the authority of capital and to repress
class conflict, the Nazis refurbished the languishing doctrine of the
"plant community." This replaced class-based bargaining rights
and contract interpretation in labor relations law with feudal obligations. Finally, the third part considers the Nazi labor courts'
treatment of ideologically disfavored plant-community claimants,
6
i.e., communists, socialists, Jews and others.
Linder comes to grips with the larger questions raised by historians and philosophers of law, from Radbruch, Hart and Fuller
down to more recent writing, by focusing on the claims of the ideologically disfavored within the framework of general labor law
doctrines and judicial rulings. Was Nazi law a total sham, or internally consistent? To the extent it was consistent, did it reflect an
achievement on the part of law and its faithful or was the exercise
pointless? Linder's narrative is as haunting as it is compelling.
His narrative on the jurisprudential debates among Nazi legal
scholars evokes a Machiavellian predisposition to law characteristic of United States federal administrators in the 1980s. There is,
for instance, little to distinguish the jurisprudence of Ed Meese
3. Marc Linder, The Supreme Labor Court in Nazi Germany: A Jurisprudential Analysis (1987).

4. Id. at 1-94.
5. Id. at 95-204.
6. Id. at 205-90.
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from that inestimable Nazi legal star, Carl Schmitt, who recommended loyalty to Hitler and party as the primary judicial qualification and the reinstitution of an "original" cultural purity as the
principal end of judicial service. While a book review of this
length is inadequate to do justice to Linder's book, brief elaboration of the three parts may give prospective readers an indication
of the book's scope and richness.
Nazi legal scholars had a peculiar problem. While Hitler condemned "jurists and their science of law," the society's need for
deliberate self-reflection "asserted itself sufficiently to preclude
any attempt to eliminate the system of judge-made law."7 The regime relied on judges to apply general rules to individual social
events. Nevertheless, it had to ensure that judicial interpretation
of those rules would not conflict with the needs of the Nazi political economy. 8 Generally, those needs fell into three categories:
(1) legitimation of Nazi rule as a whole; (2) legitimation of judicial
judgments in terms of Nazi and traditional legal principles (particularly in contrast to that Nazi shibbeloth, "Bolshevik" justice); and
(3) certainty in labor relations to resolve disputes arising out of
"the accumulation of capital and the competition of capitals." 9
Above all, the system of rule application had to "objectify" overarching interpretive principles that would counteract subjective judicial discretion and so preserve "the purity of German blood,
German honor and genetic soundness as the basic elements of Nazi
private law." 10
To secure their aims, Nazi jurists recommended two alternative strategies. First, the regime instituted controls over judicial
decisions. However, Nazi lawmaking was itself idiosyncratic and
its ideological content hardly "monolithic, unambiguous, authoritative and uniform.""X Accordingly, judges tended to doubt their
overseers and adhered only loosely to interpretive principles the
overseers ostensibly had derived from Hitler's will or their own
Volksempfinden.12 Second, the regime selected judges on the basis of their devotion to the correctness of Hitler's values. In Curt
Rothenberger's words, "[t]he more subjectively and exclusively the
judge is bound to the ideas of Nazism, the more objective and just
his adjudications will be."'
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

3

Id. at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 4
Id. at 5-6.
Id. at 4 (quoting Curt Rothenberger, Der deutsche Ricter 53-54 (1943)).
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Eventually, as Linder shows through his detailed analysis of
Nazi labor court appointments, early membership in the Nazi
party served as the principal marker for devotion to Hitler's will
and Volksgebundenheit.14 Still, between arriving at the latter solution and instituting it, Nazi jurists together with their critics, addressed a variety of complex arguments about the law-like
character of their system, including its legitimacy, relative autonomy and internal consistency. Much of the first part of the book
describes the debates in detail and places them in their broader jurisprudential contexts; both German antecedents and more general
discussions about Western law and legal systems. 15 The last part
of the introduction describes the system the Nazis elaborated to
confine, atomize and adjudicate labor disputes.
Once Linder has set forth the aims and premises of labor adjudication during the Nazi regime, he confronts the problem of labor law itself-namely, how did judges generate rulings in labor
cases that in fact conformed to the requirements of the Nazi political economy, above all to repress class conflict. In general, the
Nazis decimated collective bargaining rights statutorily and further thwarted labor radicalism through the SA and later the SS.16
Yet, the regime had to defend against the possibility that the
countless instances of plant leaders exploiting or mistreating individual workers and groups of workers would renew labor unity
and prompt class warfare. In that regard, adjudication served the
state by atomizing general perceptions of exploitation and treating
individual claims with apparent dignity.17
The elaboration of a workable doctrine for securing these
aims was complicated by a combination of received laws and conventions in labor relations, divisions among different classes of
capitalists, and divisions between private capital and the state, both
in its role as coordinator of the economy and its role as emRothenberger, like Schmitt, was an esteemed legal scholar who served in the Nazi
regime. Id. at 6-14. The Nazi lights grappled with the contradictions of reconciling
the received legal system's autonomy principles with Nazi rulers' objectives.
14. Id. at 64-94. Tables 3 and 4 show that by 1938 Nazi party members constituted the majority on the Supreme Labor Court and that, by comparison with German lawyers in general, most of them had joined the party relatively early in its
development. Id. at 77-87.
15. Linder's explication of the German conception of Rechtsstaat within the
larger context of legal positivism and rule of law is worth noting, especially the differing perspectives of three leftist anti-Nazi German exiles, Ernst Fraenkel, Franz
Neumann, and Otto Kirchheimer, on the Nazi's adaptation of the Rechtsstaat to
their own political and economic objectives. Id. at 31-63.
16. Id. at 109-10.
17. Id. at 119.
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ployer.' 8 Nazi legislation insisted upon the primacy of the plant
community under the leadership of the plant manager or entrepreneur or manager.19 In restoring the economy's faded communitarian (or feudal) ideals, the rulers expected to eradicate the selfinterested, competitive values inherent in the Weimar Republic's
contractual vision of labor relations. In the context of the plant
community, workers had legitimate, albeit limited and residual,
claims to general welfare. By continuing to perform their duties as
workers without disruption, they could invoke corresponding duties on the part of plant managers to look out for workers' welfare,
at least so long as the business of the plant itself was secure.
These managerial duties were often the subjects of the litigation.
Linder's review of the cases suggests that the courts were
surprisingly solicitous of worker claims and that Nazi labor adjudication was not altogether a sham geared toward worker exploitation.20 At the same time, that very finding suggests how
undesirably powerful a law-like apparatus may be. The labor
courts' legal authenticity, especially insofar as it diminished the
need for administrative interventions and SA/SS actions, apparently contributed to the Nazis' success in sustaining industrial production and maintaining order.
The work of the Nazi labor courts was also fraught with telling curiosities and ironies. Judges, for instance, quite frequently
slipped back into the language of contract to resolve disputes, in
part because contract doctrine had become so deeply engrained in
German labor law, in part because the idea of the plant community was far less real than the combative relationships of capitalists and workers. 2 1 Linder also describes the cases in which Nazi
leaders had to weigh the costs and benefits of judicial autonomy directly against expedience. 2 2 A fifteen-year-old boy claimed lost
wages against the state, and the labor court, interpreting the labor
code somewhat formalistically, upheld the boy's claim. The labor
ministry in turn chastised the court, conceding in effect that the
entire adjudication was little better than sham, since state administrators had it in their power to circumvent the court's ruling in
future cases and possibly even with respect to the boy himself.
Yet, in a similar case decided soon after, the very same labor minister chastised the court for acquiescing too easily in administrative
decisions. Why, Linder asks, did the highest ministerial bureau18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

95-110.
110-22.
123-208.
119-22, 138-60.
175-79.
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crats insist on autonomous court review of their decisions when
the bureaucrats themselves "could manifestly have interpreted
their own statutory intentions more reliably?" 23 Linder suggests
that the Nazis' dependence on the law's relative autonomy to
achieve legitimacy for their regime may have stood in the way of
expedience.
Finally, Linder examines those cases in which the Nazi courts
sought to reconcile the regime's antagonism toward enemies
within and its preference for handling typical labor disputes consistently. The courts had to dispose of the enemies in ways that
would not undermine the internal logic of their rulings or expose
the whole system as sham. In large part the courts' work was
eased by a range of statutes and administrative activities.2 4 Still,
cases did arise that put the judges to the test. Linder acknowledges that putting too much emphasis on certain of these cases
may take on the appearance of "grotesque academic fiddling." He
observes "in light of the world-historical murder organized by the
Nazi apparatus, what purpose does it serve to examine the
rearguard struggles of a handful of Jews to preserve their pension
rights, holiday pay or entitlement to one month's salary when
fired as a result of anti-Semitic laws or personal prejudice?" 25 Yet,
the answers become painfully clear in light of the book as a whole.
While Linder contributes enormously to an impression of what
went on in labor adjudication during the Nazi regime and also to
an understanding of why the Nazi labor courts worked as they did,
the larger contribution of this work is in its graphic illustration of
the power and limits of modern law.
Linder's study of the courts' treatment of the state's enemies
draws a persuasive picture of professional rationality-that is, the
capacity of a judicial corps to achieve quasi-autonomous and nonideological consistency of judgment, even while the values supporting consistency have been thoroughly uprooted in the society from
which the cases spring. This leads at last to what I take as the central conclusion of this book: that while law offers society tracks to
smooth its ride, it cannot, even at its best, prevent the rulers from
pointing those tracks toward hell.2 6 Certainly, this is not a novel
23. Id. at 178.
24. The pertinent chapters are arranged by "enemy" classes, i.e., Communists,
Trade Unionists, Social Democrats, various anti-Nazi activists, and Jews. Each of
these chapters includes a description of relevant statutes followed by the cases. Id.

passim.
25. Id. at 246.

26. Linder's study takes the form of a monograph, and so ends somewhat abruptly with an analysis of the labor courts' treatment of Jewish workers. To the
extent the book implicates broader conclusions, it does so through the introductory
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conclusion, but few studies, historical or otherwise, have demonstrated the limits of law as we still know it so ably.
materials, particularly its elaboration of the jurisprudential debates, and through
the drifts of the cases themselves. Given the richly detailed nature of the analysis,
a broader concluding chapter with an elaboration of the study's implications would
have been useful.

